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McMAHON: THE NEXT TEN YEARS*
Therese Maynard'
INTRODUCTION
I thank Professor Norman Poser for his invitation to par-
ticipate in today's Symposium on securities arbitration, a very
timely and important topic. I have found all of the presenta-
tions made by today's distinguished speakers to be quite inter-
esting and thought provoking.
In his presentation, Judge Selya suggested that, generally
speaking, academics come to a symposium-such as this one
on the topic of Securities Arbitration-with a fixed perspective
on the topic at hand, a perspective that is often dictated by the
views these academics have already expressed on the topic. As
the last speaker of this Symposium, I am confident in suggest-
ing that I am the only academic to stand at this lectern today
who comes to our topic with no agenda. Although knowledge-
able in the area of federal securities law, I was not particularly
familiar with the law of securities arbitration prior to receiving
Professor Poser's invitation to comment on the paper presented
by Professor Marc Steinberg. Consequently, there is no agenda
or established perspective that I bring to the podium today as
a commentator on Professor Steinberg's presentation.
In his paper, Professor Steinberg maintains that today
modern securities arbitration offers a more favorable forum
than does litigation in federal court for the resolution of
investors' claims in broker-customer disputes.' He reaches this
©1996 Therese Maynard. All rights reserved.
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. BJA,
University of California, Irvine, 1978; J.D., UCLA, 1981. An earlier draft of this
Comment was read by several of my colleagues, and I thank Janet Kerr, Norman
Poser, Kay Tate, Steve Callaway and Rochelle Lindsay for their thoughtful
comments and suggestions, as well as for our many discussions of the issues posed
in this securities arbitration Symposium. Anastasia Liakas, Loyola Law School,
class of 1997, cheerfully provided excellent research assistance, for which I am
grateful.
1 This piece was prepared as a Comment on Marc Steinberg, Securities Arbi-
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conclusion by emphasizing that over the last two decades fed-
eral courts have substantially narrowed the availability of
relief under the federal securities laws primarily because the
Supreme Court, and increasingly the lower federal courts as
well, have interpreted federal remedies in a very restrictive
fashion.2 In the process of reaching this conclusion, Professor
Steinberg's paper also debunks the popular myth that arbi-
tration is a forum that favors the securities industry.
I agree with Professor Steinberg that all the "evidence"
currently available supports his conclusion that arbitrating
investor claims may well be preferable to litigating these
claims in federal court. Having said that, however, I do not
believe that Professor Poser brought me all the way from Cali-
fornia to chime in with a Commentary that is in the nature of
a litigator's 'Me, too!" brief. So, I thought that today I would
assume the role of devil's advocate and share some of the
thoughts that I have been reflecting on as I contemplated the
implications of Professor Steinberg's conclusion for the future
of securities arbitration over the next ten years.3
tration: Better for Investors Than The Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1503 (1996).
Professor Steinberg's article, and consequently my Commentary as well, focus on
arbitration between brokerage firms and their public customers, including unso-
phisticated indiviaual investors. This Commentary, therefore, does not address
arbitration of industry claims (broker vs. broker disputes), nor does it address
employment claims (employee/registered representative vs. employer/broker-dealer
firm), because each of these types of claims involves public policy considerations
that are quite distinct from the disputes that arise between brokers and their
customers.
2 In addition to these case law developments, Congress weighed in by enacting
reform legislation in December 1995, the effect of which is to further restrict the
scope of relief available to investors under the federal securities laws. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For commentary describing the impact of this
major piece of legislation which reformed litigation practices under the federal
securities laws, see, e.g., Glen Shu, Take a Second Look: Central Bank After Pri.
vate Securities Reform Act of 1995, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 539, 542 (1996) ("[Jlust as
the Central Bank Court limited a plaintiffs ability to bring suit against certain
defendants, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(Reform Act), which places even greater restrictions on plaintiffs chances of recov-
ery.") (footnotes omitted); Symposium on the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 1219 (1996).
' Indeed, let me emphasize that the observations and inquiries that I pose in
this Commentary were provoked by the excellent paper that Professor Steinberg
has written.
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We have come together today to reflect on the develop-
ments in the law of securities arbitration that have occurred in
the almost ten years since the Supreme Courtes landmark
decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon.4
And, if Professor Steinberg is right-as I think he is-we have
witnessed during the course of the last ten years the evolution
of securities arbitration into a much more investor friendly fo-
rum. However, in thinking about Professor Steinberg's descrip-
tion of the developments in this area of securities law over the
last decade, I kept finding myself wondering- What will the
next ten years bring? Will securities arbitration continue to be
as investor friendly? Will securities arbitration prove to be a
viable, cost-effective, user friendly alternative forum for the
resolution of broker-customer disputes?
These are the questions that I will raise in this Commen-
tary. First, I will examine the future of securities arbitration
over the next ten years from a micro perspective-by which I
mean to examine the future of securities arbitration from the
perspective of the parties themselves to the process. Whether
the current state of securities arbitration, as described by Pro-
fessor Steinberg and the other speakers today, offers the prom-
ise of providing cost-effective resolution of individual disputes
on a case-by-case basis in the future will be addressed. Second,
I will examine the future of securities arbitration over the next
ten years from a macro perspective-by which I mean to ask,
from a more general public policy perspective, whether arbitra-
tion will offer a socially desirable alternative forum in the
future for the resolution of disputes between investors and
their brokers. This Section will raise some important public
policy considerations that society will be forced to grapple with
over the next ten years. It is on these issues where Professor
Steinberg and I might be seen as parting company in our
thinking.
5
' 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
'See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ARBITRATION PROCESS FROM THE INDIVIDUAL PARTIES'
PERSPECTIVE
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in McMahon, we
heard a cacophony of voices charging that the industry spon-
sored securities arbitration process was unfair. In the immedi-
ate aftermath of the McMahon decision, investors claimed that
the industry sponsored arbitration process was stacked in
favor of the securities industry defendants.6 Investors' charges
of unfairness yielded a set of procedural reforms that were
intended to ameliorate those concerns regarding the process
used in arbitrating investors' claims against their brokers.
However, these reform efforts now seem to have increased
the general level of dissatisfaction with the arbitration process,
particularly among the members of the securities industry
itself.' Indeed, now we hear complaints that the modern arbi-
tration process no longer offers its original advantages. In
other words, the procedural reforms that have been imple-
mented piecemeal over the last ten years are now seen as
undermining the goals of the arbitration process, which was
originally intended to offer speedy and final resolution of the
parties' disputes in a cost-effective fashion. Ironically enough, I
have even overheard some defense lawyers wax nostalgic about
the "good old days"-back when they used to try cases in front
of decisive federal judges who were willing to apply the rule of
law to "throw the case out of court!"'
' See, e.g., Robert Gregory, Arbitration: It's Mandatory But It Ain't Fair, 19
SEC. REG. L.J. 181 (1991) (stating that arbitration, as presently conducted by the
NASD, NYSE or AMEX is not fair); Neal M. Brown et al., Arbitration of Custom-
er-Broker Disputes Arising Under the Federal Securities Laws and RICO, 15 SEC.
REG. L.J. 3, 32-36 (1987) (recommending a set of reforms to be made to the exist-
ing arbitration system, without which "the policy of investor protection embodied
in the federal securities laws will be at risk; and courts will be plagued with
cases involving adhesion contracts, unfairness in the arbitration process, and
awards where arbitrators fail to follow statutory law").
7 DAVID E. ROBBINS ED., SEcURITIEs ARBITRATION 1996 passim (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-949, 1996); Practicing Law Institute,
Taped Proceedings of Panel Presentation, Securities Arbitration 1996 Program
(July-Aug. 1996); Norman Poser, Foreword: Securities Arbitration: A Decade After
McMahon, 62 BROOK L. REV. 1329, 1331 (1996).
' Generally speaking, federal district judges today are perceived as more will-
ing than securities arbitrators to dismiss customers' claims altogether on such
grounds as failure to plead claims adequately, or failure to bring claims in a time-
ly manner, thereby resolving the case early on in the litigation process. Indeed,
[Vol. 62: 1533
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The ultimate irony of the last ten years may very well be
that brokers and their counsel-among the strongest propo-
nents for enforcing the pre-dispute arbitration clauses routine-
ly included by brokers in their new account agreements with
customers-are now generally seen as disillusioned and dissat-
isfied with the arbitration process. Not coincidentally, this shift
towards disillusionment in the brokers' perception of arbitra-
tion mirrors the positive shift that Professor Steinberg de-
scribes in his article concerning investor perception of securi-
ties arbitration over the last ten years since the Mctfahon
decision.9
H. THE GOALS OF ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM
FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In thinking about the basis for the parties' shifting posi-
tions as to the "fairness" of securities arbitration, my analysis
starts by reflecting on the general goals to be served by creat-
ing this alternative dispute resolution forum known as securi-
ties arbitration. Arbitration of broker-customer disputes was
originally conceived and intended to serve certain specific,
well-defined goals. 0 First, arbitration was to yield speedy res-
olution of the parties' disagreements. The process of arbitra-
tion, as compared to litigation, was supposed to minimi e delay
and thereby facilitate early resolution of the parties' claims.
Second, arbitration of investor claims was to provide a more
economical forum for resolving the parties' disputes because of
the less costly, more streamlined procedures typically used in
arbitrating the parties' claims. Lastly, the arbitration process
was to promote finality of the outcome. The arbitration forum
promised to reduce vastly, if not virtually eliminate, appeals by
allowing appeals from arbitration panel awards to be taken to
there has even been some suggestion made among members of the securities in-
dustry that a return to litigation may prove quite attractive. Poser, supra note 7,
at 1331.
Steinberg, supra note 1, at 1506-09.
10 See, e.g., ANTHONY W. DJINIS & JOSEPH A. POST, SECURITIES ARBITRATIoN:
PRACTICE AND FORMS § 4.04 (1991); C. EDWARD FIETCHER, ARBITRATING SECURI-
TIES DISPUTES, 104-06, 111-15 (1990); PHILIP HOBLUI, SECURITIES ARBITRATION:
PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 2-4 to 2-5 (2d ed. 1992); DAVID ROBBINS, SECURI-
TIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL § 1.01-1.13 (2d ed. 1995); James Beckley,
Equity and Arbitration, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1996, supra note 7, at 44-52.
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the courts only on the most narrow of grounds. As compared to
litigation in federal courts, arbitration therefore was to pro-
mote certainty as to the resolution of the parties' claims
against one another and thereby promote finality of the
arbitrators' decision.1 For all these reasons, arbitration was
originally created in order to offer a simpler, more cost-effec-
tive alternative to litigation. In other words, arbitration was to
be a forum that was a truly meaningful alternative to judicial
resolution of the parties' claims.
By contrast, the primary goal of civil litigation has always
been to promote the accuracy of the court's decision.12 The
"i Some commentators have suggested that arbitration was intended to serve a
fourth goal, that of privacy, although I believe this privacy interest is rather hard
to characterize as a primary goal to be attained through the arbitration process.
See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World
of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK L. REV. 1095 (1993) (protection of privacy
interests may be viewed as a goal to be served by resorting to arbitration rather
than litigation). Instead, protection of the parties' privacy interests seems to be
more in the nature of an "inevitable by-product" of relying on arbitration as an
alternative to litigating the parties' claims. Unlike the public proceedings of litiga-
tion, the confidentiality of arbitration tends to be preserved by the rules of proce-
dure used in arbitration, and therefore these arbitral rules may be viewed as
protecting the parties' privacy interests. However, many of the arbitral rules that
result in protecting privacy interests were in fact implemented in order to promote
the other three primary goals of the arbitration process. As an example, confidenti-
ality of the arbitration proceedings is maintained, at least in part, by the lack of
any written record of the arbitration hearing itself. However, the absence of any
written transcript is in large part intended to promote the finality of the
arbitrators' decision on the assumption that the existence of a written record
might otherwise encourage the disappointed party to appeal the arbitrators' ruling
or award. See FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 4.3; Beckley, supra note 10, at 31, 51-
52 ("Courts have protected the right of an arbitrator to issue a binding decision
without a written statement explaining their reasons for issuing an award. Courts,
in protecting the right of an arbitrator, are protecting an individual's right to con-
tract for an inexpensive and expedient means of dispute resolution.").
2 See, e.g., Stephen Bundy, Valuing Accuracy-Filling Out the Framework:
Comment on Kaplow (2), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1994) (questioning "whether
American adjudication spends too much time and treasure in pursuit of factual
truth"); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analy-
sis, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 307 (1994) ("Concerns for the accuracy of adjudication per-
meate analyses of procedural rules .... Yet the value of more accurate adjudica-
tion is largely taken for granted."); Daniel Ortiz, Neoactuarialism: Comment on
Kaplow (1), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1994) ("Accuracy is a central, if not the cen-
tral, value of adjudication."). On the other hand, any set of rules used to adminis-
ter a system of criminal justice will reflect the very different goals to be served by
a system of criminal justice. This Commentary, however, focuses only on resolution
of civil disputes between citizens of our society, and even more specifically focuses
only on disputes arising between securities brokers and their customers. As such,
1538 [Vol. 62: 1533
McMAHON: THE NEXT TEN YEARS
goal of accuracy in the context of civil litigation encompasses
two equally important aspects, both of which bear directly on
the rules of procedure used to administer the modern process
of civil litigation. The first aspect involves accuracy in framing
and applying the rule of law to be applied by the
decisionmaker. The second aspect involves accuracy in ascer-
taining all of the relevant facts surrounding the parties' dis-
pute.'3
In light of this brief statement of the goals of litigation
and arbitration, I turn now to examine the procedural rules
used in each of these systems for dispute resolution. The pur-
pose of this examination is to determine how the procedural
rules used in each of these systems promote the stated objec-
tives of each system. So, in the case of litigation, we should see
that the procedural rules used to administer this system foster
accuracy, the dominant goal of litigation. Furthermore, in the
case of securities arbitration, we should likewise expect that
the procedural rules used will foster the stated goals of this
system, which is to provide a forum for cheap, quick and final
resolution of the parties' claims against each other. Each will
be discussed in turn below.
Ill. POTENTIAL GOALS OF PROCEDURAL RULES FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
The body of scholarship spawned by the Mc2,ahon decision
reflects a tension-and a resulting confusion-regarding secu-
rities arbitration. Indeed, as I will explain below, the literature
on securities arbitration reflects that the rules of procedure
used in today's process of securities arbitration have lost sight
of the goals to be served by preferring arbitration over litiga-
tion. This tension grows directly out of the changes made in
the arbitration process over the ten years since the McMahon
this Commentary considers only the rules of procedure used in civil litigation in
federal court and the procedural rules used in the private sector, industry spon-
sored system of securities arbitration.
" The development this century of the legal rules for discovery reflects our
judicial system's primary concern that adjudication produce accurate results. See
generally Robert Cooter & Daniel Rubinfeld, An Economic Mcdd of Legal Discou-
ery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1994) (the authors include a comprehensive bibliogra-
phy of the literature examining the American legal institution of discovery).
1996] 1539
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ruling upholding the validity of pre-dispute arbitration claus-
es. Professor Steinberg and other Symposium participants
have described in detail various procedural reforms that have
been implemented in the aftermath of the Court's decision in
McMahon.14 A rather significant consequence of these piece-
meal reform efforts is that the rules of procedure used in arbi-
tration have not developed in a consistent fashion to promote
the stated goals and objectives of securities arbitration. As a
result, there is today a substantial divergence between, on the
one hand, the rules that govern the procedures used in securi-
ties arbitration and, on the other hand, the objectives to be
served by preferring arbitration over litigation to resolve these
securities law claims. This divergence is more difficult to recog-
nize because the proponents of securities arbitration continue
to portray industry sponsored arbitration as offering a truly
meaningful alternative to litigation. In order to make clear the
ever widening gap between the arbitral rules of procedure as
they have evolved since the McMahon decision and the original
goals of the arbitration process itself, let me first briefly identi-
fy the general goals that may be served by any set of procedur-
al rules used to administer a system for dispute resolution.
One of the most important goals to be served by any set of
procedural rules is accuracy. Indeed, the dominant goal of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be summarized in that
one word-accuracy.15 The various provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure therefore are deliberately crafted so as
to promote accuracy in ascertaining all the facts surrounding
the parties' dispute;"6 in addition, the Federal Rules of Civil
14 See Bruce M. Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62
BROOK. L. Rsv. 1433, 1445-46, 1449-51 (1996); Steinberg, supra note 1, at 1511-17.
" This is not surprising, however, in light of the stated goal of our judicial
process: to ascertain truth in order to reach a fair result in light of all the rele-
vant facts and circumstances. Consequently, in our judicial system accuracy of the
decision obtained is of paramount importance, and not surprisingly the rules of
procedure used to administer the judicial process are designed to implement this
goal. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining why accurate ascertain-
ment of both the facts and the law is of paramount importance from a micro-per-
spective, that is, from the perspective of the parties themselves, especially the
investor who does not voluntarily bargain to compromise on accuracy goals by
preferring arbitration over litigation).
[Vol. 62: 1533
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Procedure are intended to ensure accuracy in the precise state-
ment, as well as in the application, of the rule of law to the
facts of the pending dispute."
Indeed, our civil litigation process has made accuracy the
primary goal, even if it means that the procedural rules used
to administer this process may trump other legitimate goals
that could be served by a set of procedural rules for a system
of dispute resolution. Among the most important of these other
goals that rules of procedure could be designed to emphasize
are the following: (1) Cost-procedural rules should not impose
unreasonable costs on either party or the dispute resolution
system;"8 (2) Bias-procedural rules should not favor or disfa-
vor either party to the dispute;' and (3) Participa-
tion-procedural rules should allow reasonable opportunities
for participation, that is, participation by the parties them-
selves, as well as by other persons who are not parties to the
dispute. Allowing the parties the opportunity to participate in
the process is generally done by giving them the chance to
have "their story heard," all of which serves important psy-
chological values from the perspective of the individual par-
ties.20 Likewise, the participation of third parties serves the
17 Accurate ascertainment of the law carries with it important public policy
concerns from a macro-perspective as welL See infra notes 41-45 and accompany-
ing text.
" There is mounting evidence that cost is increasingly a pivotal consideration
in evaluating proposals for reform of procedural rules. See, eg., Bundy, supra note
12.
19 Indeed, among the earliest measures implemented to reform industry spon-
sored securities arbitration following the McMahon decision was modification of the
definition of "public arbitrator." See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 1511-12. In addi-
tion, more recent reform measures have been proposed to further change the pro-
cess of qualifying and selecting persons to serve on the arbitration panel. See, eg.,
Report of the Arbitration Policy Task Force to the Board of Governors, National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,735, at 87,470-87,476 (Jam 1996) [hereinafter Ruder Report] .
20 See JERRY IASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158-253
(1985) (arguing that a claimant's direct participation in the proceedings has intrin-
sic value in promoting individual dignity); LAURENCE TRIBE, ADMRICAN CONStITU-
TIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) ("The due process right grants to the individuals or
groups against whom government decisions operate the chance to participate in




important function of monitoring the decisionmaking process,
thereby assuring the continued legitimacy of, and public sup-
port for, the dispute resolution forum.21
In summary, a set of procedural rules can be designed to
promote any of the following goals: (1) ensure the accuracy of
the result obtained through the dispute resolution process; (2)
minimize the costs of administering the system for dispute
resolution; (3) eliminate bias in favor of either party to the
dispute by eliminating even the appearance of bias in the
decisionmaker, as well as by eliminating bias in the rules used
to administer the system for dispute resolution; and, finally,
(4) afford a right of participation to the parties themselves, as
well as to outsiders.
It is in light of this general background regarding the
goals to be served by a set of procedural rules that one should
assess how the rules of procedure used in the two established
systems for securities dispute resolution-litigation in the
federal court and industry sponsored securities arbitra-
tion-promote the goals of each of these very different dispute
resolution systems. The next Section examines whether the
procedural reforms of the arbitration process, as implemented
over the last ten years since the McMahon decision, still pro-
mote the stated goals for arbitrating investor claims rather
than litigating them in federal court.22
IV. Do THE PROCEDURAL RULES PROMOTE THE STATED GOALS
OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION?
As just described, the rules of procedure used in federal
court litigation assume that the overriding goal of this system
of dispute resolution is to ensure the accuracy of the decision
obtained through the judicial process. 3 Nevertheless, the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure often do reflect some of the other
21 See generally Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979); Robert Pine, Rethinking the "Day in
Courts" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992).
Even more importantly, this general background, regarding the different
goals that could be served by any set of procedural rules, will offer important
insights in considering the "fairness" of the modern securities arbitration process.
2 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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possible goals for procedural rules such as cost, bias, or partici-
pation, so long as they do not substantially interfere with the
overriding goal of ensuring the accuracy of the outcome.'
As for the procedural rules used in securities arbitration,
the starting point lies in examining the important procedural
reform measures that Professor Steinberg described in his
article, which have been implemented since the McMahon deci-
sion.' All of these piecemeal procedural reforms share one
very important common denominator, however. As Judge Selya
has persuasively demonstrated in his article, all of these re-
form measures are based on the procedural rules used in the
context of our modern civil litigation system.' As such, these
piecemeal efforts to reform the procedural rules of arbitration
have resulted in reworking the modern arbitration system into
the image and likeness of the litigation system. Consequently,
the current securities arbitration system looks less and less
like a meaningful, alternative form of dispute resolution.
Nevertheless, proponents of arbitration continue to claim
that the goals of arbitration (cost, speed and finality) are being
served, and, therefore, arbitration is preferable to litigation of
investor claims against the securities industryY By trumpet-
ing the goals of arbitration as offering these important advan-
tages, the parties expectations that they will obtain a speedy,
final and cost-effective resolution of their disputes continue to
be reinforced.
24 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 13; Edward Cooper, Discovery Cost
Allocation: Comment on Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465 (1994);
Bruce Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481
(1994); Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The
Role of Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569 (1994).
See Steinberg, supra note 1, at 1511-17.
28 Selya, supra note 14, at 1436. This common denominator even carries for-
ward to the recommendations contained in the report of the Ruder Commission
released earlier this year. Ruder Report, supra note 19, at 87,463-87,468 (describ-
ing the Commission's recommendations for reform of discovery process, which in-
cluded a proposal for early automatic production of essential documents, a proposal
not unlike the recent amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 providing
for "self-executing discovery").
' These advantages of arbitration as an alternative forum for dispute resolu-
tion were originally touted in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 229-32 (1987), and continue to be repeated. See, e.g., Deborah Masucci, Secu-
rities Arbitration-A Success Story: What Does the Future Hold?, 31 WAXE FOREST
L. REv. 183, 188-98 (1996).
1996]
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The tension that results from these conflicting claims is
obvious: There is an inherent contradiction in claiming that
the modern system of securities arbitration offers a cheaper
and faster alternative to litigation while at the same time
implementing procedural reform measures for arbitration
which borrow from the procedural rules used in litigation. This
inherent inconsistency becomes rather obvious in light of the
fact that the procedural rules of litigation were designed to
implement the primary goal of ensuring the accuracy of the
judicial decision, whereas arbitration was created in order to
serve very different goals.
Despite this inherent inconsistency, it is nonetheless en-
tirely understandable that the procedural rules for arbitration
of investor claims would be reformed so that they more closely
resemble the procedural rules used in federal court litigation.
The dominant public perception of fairness in the procedures
used to resolve disputes in our society is based in large part on
their general familiarity with the procedural rules used to
administer our judicial system.28 Therefore, in order to elimi-
nate any lingering investor concerns about the fairness of in-
dustry sponsored arbitration,29 it is understandable that any
8 Certainly the lawyer's perception of "procedural fairness" has been shaped in
large part over the course of this century by the rules used to administer our
judicial system. Likewise, the expectations of the parties themselves as to the
"fairness" of procedural rules have been shaped in substantial measure by their
perception of the procedures used in civil litigation. The public's general perception
of fair procedures for dispute resolution can be based on their personal experience
with our court system or on portrayals of our court system (whether fictionalized
or not) contained in books, television programs, magazines, etc.
' In considering criticisms as to the "fairness" of the arbitration process,
whether made by claimant-investors or by defendant-brokers, the obvious question
arises as to whether it is the parties themselves or their lawyers who are actually
doing the complaining about "fairness." This is an important inquiry for me be-
cause I am less inclined to respond to "fairness" complaints that originate with
lawyers because such complaints may not reflect at all on what I see as the pri-
mary area of public policy concern: whether the legitimacy of securities arbitration
is subject to substantial erosion because the participants themselves perceive this
dispute resolution forum as fundamentally unfair. To the extent that these "fair-
ness" criticisms trace back to the parties' counsel, and not to the parties them-
selves, it may be fair to say that such complaints do not present the same kind of
threat to the legitimacy of this social institution, or at least do not demand the
same kind of response. For example, in lieu of reforming securities arbitration to
respond to lawyers' complaints of unfairness in the process, we could decide in-
stead to retrain the legal profession and expand basic legal training beyond the
accuracy model of civil litigation by including training in other skills that are
1544 [Vol. 62:1533
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proposal to reform the procedures used in arbitration would
borrow directly from the more familiar and more well-estab-
lished procedural rules used in civil litigation, such as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the cumulative
result of these piecemeal procedural reforms has been to in-
crease the level of dissatisfaction with the modem securities
arbitration process, especially among members of the securities
industry." Brokers now complain that modern arbitration no
longer offers the original advantages of speedy and cost-effec-
tive dispute resolution. This is contrary to the industry's expec-
tations of the effect of pre-dispute arbitration clauses included
in the brokers' new account agreements with their customers.
In light of this shifting focus in the complaints over the
last decade as to the "fairness" of securities arbitration, it is
imperative to explore the reasons why the procedures for arbi-
tration were reformed in such a way as to bear a strong family
resemblance to the procedural rules used in litigation. The
explanation for this comes directly out of the Supreme Court's
decision in McMahon, which is discussed below.
V. MCMATON'S IMPACT ON REFORM OF PROCEDURAL RULES
FOR SECURITIES ARBITRATION
In upholding the validity of pre-dispute arbitration claus-
es, the Supreme Court chose to prefer arbitration over litiga-
tion for resolution of broker-customer disputes."1 Since
McMahon, the securities industry has routinely required cus-
tomers who open new accounts to agree to arbitrate any future
dispute between the parties and thereby forego the opportunity
to litigate these claims in federal court.' The McMahon deci-
more suited to lawyering within the framework of other dispute resolution models,
such as mediation, arbitration or even the "early neutral evaluation" process that
has been recommended by the Ruder Report. See Ruder Report, supra note 19, at
87,450-87,458.
" See, eg., Ruder Report, supra note 19, at 87,464-87,465; Masucci, supra note
27, at 183-84; Poser, supra note 7, at 1331.
"1 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
I purposefully use the word "require" because securities arbitration in fact
has been made virtually mandatory following the Court's opinion in McMahon. See,
e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Con-
sent?, 62 BROO. L. REV. 1335, 1349-56 (1996). I am persuaded by Professor
Speidel's conclusion that any appearance of consent on the customers part is illu-
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sion, therefore, has had the practical effect of forcing the vast
majority of customer complaints into arbitration, and, there-
fore, today's investors face virtually mandatory arbitration of
their claims against their brokers. However, what the
McMahon Court failed to address adequately, when it decided
to prefer arbitration over litigation, is that this decision would
force investor claims to be brought in a forum that uses a set
of procedural rules that the customers did not knowingly and
intelligently bargain for when they agreed to the terms of the
securities industry's pre-dispute arbitration clause. The
investor's lack of meaningful choice as to the forum for resolu-
tion of a claim against his or her broker is of significant impor-
tance in explaining the imperative to reform securities arbitra-
tion procedures by borrowing from the procedural rules used in
federal court.
By contrast, where the parties have expressly bargained
for mandatory, binding arbitration, both sides to the agree-
ment have voluntarily chosen to prefer arbitration over litiga-
tion. Those parties have themselves weighed the relative ad-
vantages and disadvantages of arbitration over litigation and
on balance have voluntarily decided to prefer the advantages of
arbitration over litigation. Thus, in voluntarily negotiating for
and agreeing to mandatory arbitration of any future disputes
between them, the parties have knowingly and deliberately
made the decision to forego accuracy in order to promote fast
and cheap resolution of their disputes. The parties to this bar-
gain have decided for themselves, on the facts of their particu-
lar situation, that they are willing to accept the consequences
of this informed choice. So, by agreeing to mandatory arbitra-
tion in advance of any disagreements between them, both par-
ties have themselves decided that it is acceptable to forego the
enhanced opportunity for reaching an accurate result through
litigation in federal court of any claims they may have. Howev-
sory since the new account agreement is tantamount to a contract of adhesion.
The brokerage industry routinely insists on including a pre-dispute arbitration
clause in their new account agreements with customers. Although some observers
may well claim that, at least in theory, customers are free to take their business
elsewhere, Professor Speidel points out that as a practical matter, the customer
today has no meaningful choice other than to accept the inclusion of this pre-dis-
pute arbitration clause. So, in effect, arbitration has been made "mandatory," if
only on a "de facto" basis.
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er, McMahon has eliminated any semblance of this kind of
meaningful "investor choice" in the case of investor claims
against securities brokers.'
Following the McMahon ruling, reform of the procedural
rules of arbitration to more closely resemble the litigation
process may be viewed as a form of investor "proxy." In other
words, these procedural reforms were undertaken in lieu of
any meaningful effort to obtain voluntary, informed consent
from the investor to arbitration of any future claims against
his or her broker. Seen from this perspective, reform of the
procedural rules used in arbitration may be viewed as a form
of proxy for the lack of the investor's informed consent to man-
datory arbitration. Reforming the procedures used in arbitra-
tion removes some of the sting that inevitably arises when, at
some future time, the investor brings a claim and only then
fully appreciates the significance of the pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clause to which the investor "consented.' Improv-
ing the fairness of the arbitration process through procedural
reforms that borrow from federal court litigation addresses the
fact that the customer has not bargained voluntarily to accept
the consequences that flow from the decision to arbitrate rath-
er than litigate.
In sum, the procedural reforms that were adopted in the
wake of McMahon have been implemented to compensate for
the fact that the customer did not voluntarily negotiate and
agree to subordinate accuracy, the goal of litigation, in favor of
' See Speidel, supra note 32, at 1356-57; see alo Joel Seligman, The Quiet
Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 Hous. L. REV.
327 (1996).
" In other words, these procedural reform initiatives were undertaken in the
wake of McMahon, and in the face of investor charges that the arbitration process
was stacked in favor of the industry, in order to enhance the accuracy of the
decision reached by the panel of arbitrators. The procedural rules used in litiga-
tion became the dominant model for reform of arbitration procedures. I believe the
reforming arbitral procedures to enhance the accuracy of the process became im-
portant for at least two reasons. First, the general perception of "fairness" in the
decisionmaking process is dominated by the public's understanding and familiarity
with the procedural rules used in civil litigation. See supra notes 28-29 and accom-
panying text. Second, accuracy is important to establishing the legitimacy of the
decision, both as to the individual parties to the dispute as well as from a broader
public policy perspective as to the public's perception of the legitimacy of arbitra-




pursuing a cheap, quick and final resolution of the parties'
disagreement, which is the goal served by the process of securi-
ties arbitration and which were clearly the goals the industry
intended. Because the industry failed to obtain the customer's
informed consent to prefer the goals of arbitration over that of
litigation, it was forced to address the procedural "fairness"
concerns that investors inevitably raise at such later time
when they are forced to arbitrate their claims. Moreover, these
investor fairness concerns have been dealt with by reforming
arbitration procedures so that the current process of securities
arbitration has become practically a clone of litigation.
We, as a society, are now forced to deal with the conse-
quences of arbitration having evolved into a clone of litigation.
However, this ongoing public debate fails to appreciate that
the piecemeal reform measures of the last ten years have
caused the process of arbitration slowly but surely to drift
away from its- original, stated objectives: to offer a forum for
inexpensive, quick and final resolution of parties' disputes.
While the reform measures adopted over the last ten years
were largely based on the procedural rules of litigation, the
ongoing public dialogue has failed to appreciate that the proce-
dural rules of litigation were designed primarily to promote a
very different objective-accuracy of outcome. Once we fully
acknowledge the inherent inconsistency that results from these
piecemeal reforms, then I believe that we, as a society, will be
forced to confront-candidly and directly-important public
policy issues: Do we really intend to impose on investors a
system of dispute resolution that emphasizes the stated goals
of speed, cost and finality of result? Do we really intend to
promote arbitration goals at the expense of accuracy for these
parties, one of whom had no choice? Are we willing to sacrifice
accurate ascertainment of the facts regarding the parties' dis-
putes, as well as the accurate application of the rule of law to
these facts, in order to impose on the parties a forum that
provides for a cheap, quick and final resolution of their dis-
pute?
In light of the reforms that have been made to the proce-
dures used in securities arbitration over the last ten years, it
is increasingly apparent that the Supreme Court's decision in
McMahon, giving preference to arbitration over litigation, may
not have adequately addressed the public policy implications of
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this preference-at least not in situations where the parties
have not voluntarily chosen to prefer the advantages of the
arbitration process over the litigation forum. Furthermore, as
we look ahead to the next ten years, we need to ask, from a
larger, public policy perspective, whether the current, reformed
arbitration process will provide an adequate system for resolv-
ing disputes between brokers and their customers.'
VI. THE SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCESS FROM A PUBLIC
POLICY PERSPECTIVE
Turning to the macro-perspective, the Courtes ruling in
McMahon raises important public policy concerns regarding
the future development of the rule of law. These concerns loom
ever larger as it becomes increasingly evident that McMahon
has resulted in arbitration becoming virtually the exclusive
forum for resolution of customers' claims against their brokers.
This Section sets forth the nature of these public policy con-
cerns.
As was the case in the last Section in examining the fair-
ness of arbitral rules of procedure from a micro-perspective,
there is considerable evidence that there is dissatisfaction, on
the part of both customers and brokers, with the arbitration
process,36 although the exact nature of the parties' complaints
' The Ruder Report does not reflect this type of probing examination of funda-
mental public policy concerns. The Ruder Commission undertook its review of
securities arbitration on the assumption that arbitration is here to stay as the
most appropriate forum for resolution of investors' claims against their brokers.
See Ruder Report, supra note 19, at 87,438; Seligman, supra note 33, at 343-46;
Speidel, supra note 32, at 1356-57. I am not persuaded of the legitimacy of this
assumption, however, at least as to resolution of broker-customer disputes. Putting
aside employment claims and intra-industry disputes, which are outside the focus
of both Professor Steinberg's paper and of my Commentary, I believe that there
are important public policy concerns that underlie the Commision's presumption
favoring arbitration of customer claims that merit a more complete and
thoroughgoing examination and public debate before industry sponsored arbitration
becomes even more entrenched as the dominant, if not exclusive, forum for deter-
mining the merits of customers' claims against their brokers.
"6 All of which ultimately leaves me with a perverse curiosity as to exactly
who perceives the arbitration process to be 'unfair.' I am curious both as to who
complains about the fairness of the procedures that govern the arbitration process,
as well as who is complaining about the terms of the arbitrators' awards. Is it the
parties to the arbitration proceeding? Or, is it their lawyers? I think the answer
to this question is important because it will determine whether to respond at all
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varies considerably." In his introduction this morning, Profes-
sor Poser gave several examples of the types of criticisms that
have been made regarding the modern arbitration process.38
As to the parties' perception of the "fairness" of the sub-
stantive outcome, their complaints about the arbitration award
to complaints as to fairness of the arbitration process. Moreover, if a response is
determined to be appropriate, the answer to this question will help to determine
how to respond-to decide what specific reform measures are appropriate. See
supra note 29.
' Obviously, the "dissatisfaction" I am referring to here is something more
than merely the natural disappointment of a party who expected the award to
include a much larger recovery. I have little sympathy with what amounts to just
another complaint that the arbitrators did not award enough in damages to the
claimant; and I have a similar lack of sympathy with brokers who complain that
they had to pay too much to the claimant. I believe that policymakers can gen-
erally ignore these inevitable grumblings unless the parties' complaints raise con-
cerns as to the fundamental fairness of the procedures used in securities arbitra-
tion or unless thes complaints reflect the impact that arbitration is having on the
further development of the rule of law by impairing the future development of
substantive legal standards to be used to decide the validity of future claims.
38 Poser, supra note 7, at 1331-32. The various types of complaints include the
following-
1) the "split the baby" nature of arbitrators' awards;
2) the arbitrators' failure to award attorneys fees;
3) the arbitrators' failure to award punitive damages;
4) the arbitrators' failure to explain basis of decision, which includes
criticisms as to:
i) the failure to explain either the cause of action or the legal
principles that were applied on by the arbitrators or the panel to decide
the case; or
ii) the arbitrators' failure to describe in any factual detail the
nature of the culpable conduct on the part of either or both of the
parties.
See S. JAFFEE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS: A GUIDE TO THE REGU-
LATORY PROCESS 19 (1977) (regarding the "split the baby" compromising nature of
arbitration awards); James N. Benedict & Nancy A. Brown, The Power of Arbitra-
tors to Award Punitive Damages, 25 REV. SEC. & COMIODITIES REG. 71, 79 (1992)
(maintaining that punitive damages awards in arbitration "are violative of due
process"); David A. Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base Their Deci-
sions: The SROs Must Decide, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1988) (exploring the issues of
"whether arbitrators will base their award on commercial equitable judgments or
on a strict adherence to legal precedence"); Masucci, supra note 27, at 193-94
(regarding the award of attorneys' fees in arbitration proceedings); Margo E.K.
Reder, Punitive Damages Are a Necessary Remedy in Broker-Customer Securities
Arbitration Cases, 29 IND. L. REV. 105, 130 (1995) (maintaining that "[plunitive
damages must be available as a remedy in securities arbitration"); Perry E.
Wallace, Jr., Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriguez, and the New Rules:
Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1191, 1203-05 (1990)
(raising concerns as "to the application of legal theories underlying (investor]
claims brought to arbitration").
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often focus on the substantive legal standard that was applied
by the panel of arbitrators to reach their decision on the facts
of a particular case. In other words, the parties' complaints
generally focus on either the way the arbitrators framed the
relevant rule of law, or alternatively, the way the arbitrators
applied the relevant rule of law to the particular set of facts at
issue."
The extent to which these complaints about the fairness of
the results obtained in an arbitration proceeding merit a re-
sponse depends on whether the arbitration process is having a
deleterious impact on the further refinement and development
of the rule of law. In particular, the decision in McMahon en-
forcing pre-dispute arbitration clauses of the type that are now
standard fare throughout the securities industry has created
the possibility for the further erosion-if not ultimately the
virtual extinction-of the rule of law, at least in the area of
customer disputes with their securities brokers. When viewed
from this broader perspective, McMahon obviously raises im-
portant public policy concerns that transcend the specifics of
any particular investor's dispute with his or her broker.
Here is where I disagree with what I see as certain as-
sumptions that are implicit in the conclusions Professor
Steinberg reaches in his article. In concluding that arbitration
of investor claims may well be preferable today to litigating
such claims in federal court, Professor Steinberg's argument
seems to assume that the rule of law continues to play a deci-
sive, perhaps even determinative, role in the arbitrators'
decisionmaking process. This implicit premise is not easy to
accept. I also take issue with Professor Steinberg to the extent
his paper, at least implicitly, assumes that if we rely on arbi-
tration as virtually the exclusive method for resolution of the
parties' disputes in this area of securities law, there will be no
negative impairment on the continued development of the rule
of law.
See Beckley, supra note 10; Karen Kupersmith, A Perspective on the Role of
the Arbitrator in Securities Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297 (1996);
Steinberg, supra note 1, at 1514-19; John FX. Peloso, Whether Arbitrators Have a
Duty to Apply the Law, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 18, 1996, at 3.
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In examining the impact McMahon has had, and will con-
tinue to have, on the development of the substantive law used
by arbitrators to resolve customers' claims against their bro-
kers, the starting point lies in identifying the rule of law that
is most often at issue in resolving these disputes. Much as Ste-
phen Friedman did as part of his Commentary this morning, I
start from the general premise that the vast majority of
investors' claims against their brokers are fundamentally
grounded on some type of claim of breach of fiduciary duty. In
this context, I have often heard the acronym "SCUM" used to
refer to the causes of action that investors most often allege
against their brokers. SCUM refers to the causes of action for
Suitability, Churning, Unauthorized trading, and Misrepresen-
tation. Notably, all of these claims fundamentally arise out of a
broker's breach of fiduciary duty owed to a customer."
The rule of law that is fundamentally at issue in any of
these SCUM disputes, therefore, is the general rule imposing a
fiduciary duty on the broker because of the agency relationship
that is usually established between securities brokers and
their customers. This general fiduciary duty principle, howev-
er, requires further refinement in order to define the specific
scope of the broker's obligations to the customer; in addition,
the scope of the customer's responsibility, if any, for his or her
own trading activity in the financial markets must be taken
into account in determining the scope of the broker's obliga-
tions to this customer. In large part, the SCUM acronym re-
flects this further refinement of the broker's obligations be-
cause it highlights the application of the general fiduciary duty
principle to certain kinds of recurring problems in the context
of the broker-customer relationship. Although the SCUM acro-
40 Many misrepresentation claims do not implicate a breach of fiduciary duty
since these claims arise out of affirmative misrepresentations and therefore such
claims amount to a tort action for fraud. See NOPMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER
LAW & REGULATION 80-82 (1995). However, to the extent a customer's fraud claim
is based on deceit-in other words, the failure to disclose material information as
opposed to claims of affirmative misrepresentation-such omissions are generally
actionable only where there is some independent source of a duty to disclose, such
as the fiduciary relationship arising out of the broker-customer relationship. See
id. at 83-84. Consequently, many investor claims that fall within the "misrepre-
sentation" prong of the "SCUM" acronym do involve a breach of fiduciary duty
claim to the extent the claim is based on a failure to disclose, rather than on a
claim of misrepresentation of a material fact.
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nym does not purport to be an exhaustive description of the
scope of fiduciary obligations arising out of the broker-custom-
er relationship, it nonetheless reflects specific applications of
this fiduciary principle. In turn, these specific applications
serve as a guide for determining the scope of the parties' obli-
gations in the case of future dealings between brokers and
their customers.
Seen from this perspective, the general rule of law impos-
ing a fiduciary duty on the broker-customer relationship leads
to the further development of more precisely defined standards
of conduct that govern future dealings between brokers and
their customers, primarily through decisional law and adminis-
trative regulation. Thus, the law of fiduciary duty serves the
general function of regulating the standards of fair conduct in
commercial practices within the securities brokerage industry,
and continues to evolve to refine the standards of professional
conduct required of members of the securities industry.
The importance of a well-developed body of legal standards
that also has the capacity to continue to evolve, in order to
accommodate future changes in the securities markets and the
accompanying changes in commercial practices, cannot be
overstated. The capacity for continuous development of stan-
dards of fair conduct assumes even greater significance when
considering the question of what standard should be used by
arbitrators to decide whether a breach of fiduciary duty has
occurred on the facts of a particular investor's claim against
his or her broker.
In considering how to define the applicable standard for a
broker's breach of fiduciary duty, arbitrators have a wide range
of alternative approaches. Arbitrators may choose to use a
subjective approach that frames the standard for determining
breach by ascertaining the expectations of the parties to this
fiduciary relationship. Based on these expectations, the arbi-
trators then determine whether a breach has occurred by de-
ciding either what standard the parties expressly bargained
for, or more likely, what the parties would have bargained for
had they anticipated this particular set of circumstances. Al-
ternatively, arbitrators may choose to use a more objective ap-
proach that frames the standard for determining breach of
fiduciary duty by applying the expectations of a reasonably
prudent customer and a reasonably prudent broker acting
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under a similar set of circumstances. As a final alternative,
arbitrators may be allowed the freedom to decide whether a
breach of fiduciary duty has occurred based on their own sense
of what is the fair or equitable result in light of the facts of
each particular case.4'
The important public policy implications that McMahon
created for the future development of the rule of law in this
area are dramatically highlighted given this range of standards
for determining whether a breach of fiduciary duty has oc-
curred. Now that McMahon has substantially eliminated any
judicial consideration of investor claims involving the broker's
breach of fiduciary duty,4 2 the possibility for continued judi-
cial development of standards for determining a broker's
breach of fiduciary duty has been arrested. Virtually the only
authoritative body of decisional law available today to guide
the arbitrators is the case law developed prior to McMahon.
Even this guidance eventually will be rendered inadequate to
address fully these breach of fiduciary claims in light of the
accelerating pace of change in the global financial markets.
Since the arbitrators are not required to explain the bases
of their decision, either as to their findings of fact or as to their
statement of the relevant rule of law, there is virtually no
possibility that the decisions of arbitration panels can be relied
on to fill this void created by the McMahon ruling. Therefore,
the fundamental concern in the wake of the McMahon decision
is whether there is some mechanism in place that will allow
for the continued development of the rule of law on an incre-
"' Over the course of the last ten years, many participants in the securities
markets have come to believe that the standard used by arbitrators to decide
broker-customer disputes involved some personalized notion of the individual arbi-
trators trying to "do equity." See, e.g., Beckley, supra note 10; Peloso, supra note
39. This perception is often the product of a perceived inconsistency in the results
obtained in different arbitration proceedings, all of which appear to involve fact
patterns that arise out of substantially the same kind of alleged misconduct. This
perception invites criticism, at least from the parties to the arbitration process,
that arbitration is "unfair" as a result of these perceived inconsistencies in the
decisions reached by the arbitrators. In light of these claims of unfairness, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to predict outcomes in future arbitration matters and
to offer advice regarding the legitimacy of proposed changes in business practices.
Thus, the modern process of securities arbitration further erodes future develop-
ment of the rule of law by undermining the objectives to be served by establishing
a rule of law.
42 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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mental basis. I am not convinced that we have adequately
considered the consequences of disrupting this common law
tradition.
Moreover, now that arbitration has become virtually the
exclusive forum for resolution of broker-customer disputes, an
important check that Professor Steinberg seems to assume will
be imposed on the arbitration process-namely, that the panel
of arbitrators will apply the rule of law-is no longer available.
The decisions of the arbitrators are not subject to the accuracy
check that is imposed by the procedures used in civil litigation
since there is no appellate review of the accuracy of the
arbitrators' decision in either framing or applying the rule of
law. Arbitrators are not required to explain the bases for any
award they make. Moreover, the very limited statement of
decision that the panel of arbitrators is required to produce
today fails to explain how it applied the rule of law to the facts
before the panel.' The panel also does not have to provide
any analysis or explanation of their understanding or interpre-
tation of the scope of fiduciary obligations arising out of the
broker's relationship with his or her customer." Although
business practices, out of necessity, must evolve to accommo-
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INc. ('NASD"), CODE OF
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 41 (1996); Steinberg, supra note 1, at 1519 (Arbitra-
tors "are reluctant to explain their rationale in a written opinion. The end product
is one that reaches a defined result with no reasoning to support such a result.").
" The difficulties arising out of the absence of any published explanation for
the arbitrators' ruling have become increasingly apparent over the last ten years
since McMahn was decided, especially in light of the significant changes that
have taken place in the capital markets. See, eg., Beckley, supra note 10; David
Lipton, Generating Precedent in Securities Industry Arbitration, 19 SEC. REG. L.J.
26 (1991); Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be Re-
quired in All Securities Arbitration?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the
Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 151 (1995).
Moreover, the absence of any requirement that the arbitrators publish a state-
ment of the relevant legal standard they used to decide the case carries implica-
tions well beyond its impact on the parties to a particular dispute. The evolution
of the rule of law is further stunted because the arbitrators' failure to publish a
statement of the relevant rule of law deprives the participants in the securities
markets of the information they need to ascertain the scope of their obligations;
and, therefore, they lack crucial information necessary to modify their commercial
practices in order to avoid liability in the future. As a further consequence of this
failure to publish any definitive statement of the panel's reasoning, insufficient
information exists on which lawyers can capably counsel clients as to how to con-
duct their business affairs and modify their commercial practices so as to avoid
liability in the future.
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date changes made in the world's modern financial markets,
such evolution is now occurring largely without the fine-
tuning and guidance offered by decisional law-the traditional,
authoritative source of interpretive law.
Moreover, by eliminating decisional law as an authorita-
tive source for further refining the rule of law, greater burdens
presumably will be imposed on other possible sources for defin-
ing the rule of law, such as statutes and administrative rules
and regulations. In the area of securities regulation, this prob-
ably means increasing reliance will be placed on Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") enforcement efforts, as well as
on self-regulatory organization ("SRO") rulemaking efforts, all
of which are subject to oversight by the SEC." At a mini-
mum, however, increasing the influence of SRO rules as a
result of the elimination of decisional law is certainly an im-
portant public policy issue that warrants more thoughtful and
thorough consideration than has been undertaken by our policy
makers to date, as well as a meaningful opportunity for public
debate. Even more importantly, however, is the concern as to
whether the SEC has adequate resources and expertise to
perform in a responsible manner all the myriad tasks delegat-
ed to it.
" In the case of NASD reforms of its arbitration procedures, any such proposal
would generally originate with the SRO but would be subject to SEC approval
before it could be implemented. See § 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994). In the case of the recent set of recommendations for reform
of the securities arbitration process that were proposed by the Ruder Commission,
these reform recommendations also would require approval of the SEC before they
could be implemented. Once again we see the SEC placed in the role of public
policy maker, but now its expertise is stretched beyond the regulation of our
nation's capital markets to include the fairness of rules of procedure used to re-
solve disputes between brokers and their customers. I question whether this is a
wise use of the SEC's scarce resources. In addition, the substantial erosion of
decisional law as a source of authoritative interpretation of the federal securities
laws has placed a greater burden on SEC enforcement resources, raising again the
question of whether this constitutes a wise, or even effective, use of the agency's
scarce resources. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S.
299, 314-16 (1985); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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CONCLUSION
In its decision in McMahon, the Supreme Court expressed
its preference for arbitration over litigation of investor claims
against the securities industry. By doing so, the Supreme
Court has made industry sponsored securities arbitration vir-
tually the exclusive forum for resolution of broker-customer
disputes.' As investors and their brokers have come to appre-
ciate the full significance of the McMahon decision, however,
increasing pressure has been exerted to modify the procedures
used to arbitrate investor claims. For the most part, these
reforms have been modeled on the procedural rules used in our
modem civil litigation process. Consequently, as we reach the
tenth anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in
McMahon, the inescapable conclusion is that our modem sys-
tem of securities arbitration has evolved into virtually a clone
of our modem system of civil litigation.
From the individual participant's point of view, it is entire-
ly understandable that these post-McMahon reform measures
should result in the reworking of arbitral procedures to bear
this strong family resemblance to the modem litigation pro-
cess. Reform of the procedural rules for arbitration helps to
validate the pre-dispute choice of arbitration over litigation as
46 The practical effect of the Court's decision in McMalwn has been to steer
most, if not virtually all, customer disputes with their brokers into arbitration.
Recently, Professor Poser observed that since the McMahon decision, "arbitration
has indeed eclipsed litigation in this area. . . . ," although Professor Poser did
hasten to add that it has been "only a partial eclipse" since a "considerable num-
ber" of investor claims are still litigated. Poser, supra note 11, at 1095-96. Howev-
er, other commentators have gone further, contending that McMahon has resulted
in virtually a total eclipse of court litigation since most investor claims--if not
virtually all claims made by individual investors-are by arbitration. See
Constantine N. Katsoris, Shoad McMahon Be Revisited?, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1113,
1114 (1993); Speidel, supra note 32, at 1356-57 (citing the Ruder Report). Al-
though this may not have been the driving force that led the McMahon Court to
prefer arbitration over litigation, nonetheless the decision has resulted in relieving
congestion in federal court dockets by forcing investors to arbitrate their claims
against brokers. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text Removing these
securities disputes from the federal court docket, thereby making available consid-
erable judicial resources to hear other types of disputes, may in fact be a laudable
and socially desireable goal. However, this preference for arbitrating rather than
litigating investor claims certainly merits a more thoughtful and thorough exami-
nation of the important public policy concerns that underlie such a preference than
was undertaken in the McMahon decision.
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the forum for resolution of investors' claims against their bro-
kers. Such validation becomes necessary since, generally
speaking, this pre-dispute decision to arbitrate was not made
freely and voluntarily by the investor. Accordingly, procedural
reforms have been implemented in lieu of undertaking any
meaningful effort to obtain the investor's voluntary, informed
consent to arbitrate any future claims that may arise. As such,
these procedural reform measures may be viewed as a form of
"proxy" for the lack of informed consent by the investor to
mandatory arbitration of their future claims in an industry
sponsored forum.
However, these efforts to improve on the "fairness" of the
arbitration process, by implementing procedural reforms that
borrow heavily from the procedures used in our modern civil
litigation system, overlook the fact that the dominant goal of
litigation is accuracy, whereas the primary goal of arbitration
is to provide speedy, final and cost-effective resolution of the
parties' claims. In the process of borrowing procedures from
our litigation system to address investor's concerns as to the
fairness of arbitration we have substantially diluted, if not
completely eliminated, the ability of arbitration to serve its
goals by offering a meaningful alternative to litigation.
The McMahon decision also presents important implica-
tions from a larger, public policy perspective. By making arbi-
tration virtually the exclusive forum for resolution of investor
claims against their brokers, McMahon has undermined the
ability of our judicial system to continue to evolve appropriate
legal standards to regulate the standards of professional con-
duct required of members of the securities industry. In particu-
lar, now that McMahon has virtually eliminated any judicial
consideration of investor claims, the possibility for continued
judicial development of standards for determining whether
brokers have violated the fiduciary duties they owe their cus-
tomers has come to a grinding halt.
Left in the wake of McMahon is the fundamental public
policy concern as to whether there is some mechanism in place
that will allow for adequate continued development of the rule
of law on an incremental basis, including, most importantly,
further development of the scope of fiduciary duty imposed on
the broker-customer relationship. Commercial necessity dic-
tates that business practices must evolve to accommodate the
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ever-accelerating pace of change in our modern global capital
markets. However, we now face the very real prospect that
such evolution will occur without the fine tuning and guidance
offered by decisional law, which has long been the authorita-
tive source of interpretive law for determining whether brokers
have breached the fiduciary duty they owe to their customers.
At a minimum, these very real and important public policy
implications, as well as the impact on individual investors that
results from making arbitration virtually the exclusive forum
for resolution of these broker-customer disputes, deserve more
probing scrutiny than they received either in the McMahon
decision or in the public debate that has occurred since
McMahon.

